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PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO STRUCTURAL
REFORM AND THE PROMISE OF THIRD
BRANCH ANALYTIC METHODS:
A REPLY TO PROFESSORS BAUM
AND LEGOMSKY
RUSSELL R. WHEELER†
INTRODUCTION
Professors Lawrence Baum and Stephen Legomsky have
documented the shortcomings of the nation’s immigration
adjudication system as revealed in popular and academic articles,
government and interest group reports, pleas by immigration judges,
exasperated criticisms by federal appellate judges, and their own
examination of original data and other sources.
The resource-starved U.S. immigration removal adjudication
system’s sometimes shabby and uneven treatment of immigrants
sends to foreign countries some individuals who are convinced that
they received a level of justice that was no better than they would
have received from autocratic bureaucracies in their home countries.
The system permits others to stay here despite dubious claims to that
right.
Removal adjudication is part of the slot machine that is U.S.
immigration enforcement, which abides the unauthorized presence of
ten to twelve million individuals, while scooping up a fraction of them
for criminal prosecution or removal proceedings. Those targeted for
removal include some who have committed serious crimes but also
plenty who simply had the misfortune of working for employers with
a high percentage of illegal workers. Judge Jon Newman of the
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Second Circuit took note of this uneven treatment in recommending
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consider
permitting a particular immigrant whom an immigration judge had
ordered removed “to remain here along with the millions of others
1
who are not removed despite their lack of a lawful status.”
Professor Legomsky proposes a variety of changes to this system,
including a more independent first-instance judiciary and a
2
specialized federal appellate court. Professor Baum analyzes how
specialization affects judging generally and might affect removal
3
litigation. In so doing, he sheds some valuable light on how the
Legomsky specialized appellate court might operate compared to
alternative proposals for restructuring removal adjudication appeals.
Both articles are admirable for their analysis, and although chances
are slim for moving immigration adjudication outside the purview of
the Department of Justice (DOJ), it is beneficial to churn ideas and
be ready should an opportunity arise. After explaining my pessimism
about structural change, I discuss Legomsky’s proposal in Part I,
drawing on Baum’s insights on specialized courts. Then, in Part II, I
outline a new (and fairly undeveloped) approach to improving
immigration court performance without major structural change but
with a changed DOJ outlook on immigration court oversight and
management.
Effecting major legislative changes—such as a restructured
removal adjudication system—would be a hard slog even with
substantial legislative majorities in a period of unified government. It
would be even harder in a divided government or one with small
legislative majorities under pressure to reduce federal spending. In
fact, the demand for tougher enforcement of laws on the books could
lead to pressure, not to make removal adjudication more
accommodating to aliens, but just the opposite—that is, an Ashcroft
rather than a Reno mentality. Immigration hard-liners can point to
reports of disparate asylum adjudication as proof that the
adjudication system grants asylum to those who do not deserve it.
Professor Legomsky reasons, correctly I think, that the 2002 changes
at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—a reduction in size and

1. Rotimi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., concurring).
2. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635
(2010).
3. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases,
59 DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010).
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procedural cuts linked to that reduction—produced more BIA
4
decisions unfavorable to immigrants. Legislators might decide that
keeping the immigration courts resource-starved will reduce the
number of decisions in which immigrants prevail.
Perhaps the best source of optimism for restructuring and better
resourcing the adjudication system is a shared concern that it may be
sending bona fide refugees-in-fact to countries with human rights
records deplored across the political spectrum. Although most
removal proceedings completed in 2008 involved Latin Americans,
only two Latin American countries made the top ten list of
nationalities receiving asylum in 2008. China heads the list, which
included some nationalities that barely made or were not even among
the top twenty-five in completed removal proceedings—aliens from
5
Iraq, Albania, Ethiopia, Guinea, and Russia. These facts, though,
have not produced much pressure for major change so far.
I. THE LEGOMSKY PROPOSAL: UPGRADE THE ADJUDICATORS,
TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATE APPEALS
Professor Legomsky would move the immigration adjudication
function from the DOJ to an independent agency within the executive
branch and convert the immigration judges (IJs) from DOJ attorneys
to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) or Article I judges. Although I
think concern over DOJ manipulation of IJs, although valid, may be
overwrought, I endorse this proposal while cautioning that an
independent immigration adjudication agency may have more
difficulty in securing resources than does the DOJ and its Executive
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).
Professor Legomsky also would replace the BIA and the current
two-step appellate review process with a new specialized Article III
appellate court for immigration, staffed on two-year rotations by
sitting district and circuit judges; Congress would create additional
district and circuit judgeships sufficient to compensate for those
assigned temporarily to the new court. Conceptually, this idea has
some commendable features. Its enactment is highly unlikely,
however, both because of the difficulty in estimating its caseload and
the number of judges it would need and because of legislative
4. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1659.
5. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at E1 fig.6, E2 tbl.5, J1 fig.15, J2 tbl.7 (2009) [hereinafter EOIR],
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf.
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reluctance to create additional judgeships for any purpose. If enacted,
its implementation would quite likely present a logistical nightmare.
A. A Separate Executive Branch Agency for First-Instance
Immigration Removal Adjudication
Professor Legomsky would convert IJs into Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)-protected Administrative Law Judges for
Immigration (ALJIs) and place them in an Office of the Chief
Administrative Law Judge for Immigration, a separate executive
branch agency outside of any department. The president would
6
appoint the chief judge with Senate confirmation. Most sitting IJs
would be grandfathered in. A merit selection committee, rather than
the chief judge, would appoint new judges. Legomsky’s proposal
would also correct various procedural problems that bedevil the
current system. I see many advantages to this proposal and only one
potential downside.
IJs, as Professor Baum explains, have an especially difficult job
because of their working conditions, the kind of evidence before
them, and because their decisions, some literally involving life or
7
death, are largely dichotomous and final. As Professor Legomsky
shows, they also face a serious case of role conflict. On the one hand,
they are appointed and subject to removal by a DOJ that describes
them as “attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the
8
Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.”
The DOJ, through the EOIR, exercises general oversight—including
setting case disposition time frames and conducting performance
reviews—creating at least the implied threat of retribution or removal
for judges whose performance runs contrary to DOJ preferences. IJs
have documented instances in which DOJ supervisors have impinged
on the independent exercise of their responsibilities, such as the
DOJ’s failure to implement the authority Congress granted them to
9
impose contempt citations and a proposed Code of Conduct that
authorizes BIA members and IJs to discuss cases ex parte with
10
government lawyers but not immigrants or their lawyers. The

6. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1714.
7. Baum, supra note 3, at 1510–11.
8. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009).
9. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 10 (2008).
10. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1674–75.

WHEELER IN FINAL

2010]

3/30/2010 6:43:40 AM

REPLY TO BAUM AND LEGOMSKY

1851

attorney general proposed a performance evaluation system in 2006
over the objections of IJs, who pointed to the APA’s limits on agency
11
evaluations for the judges appointed under its aegis. Housing a corps
of judges charged with protecting the rights of an unpopular minority
in an executive branch law enforcement agency creates, according to
the National Association of Immigration Law Judges,
“understandable concerns that the decisions rendered by Immigration
Judges are not independent and free from pressure or
12
manipulation.”
On the other hand, the possibility of retribution against IJs is
apparently much stronger than the reality. The same DOJ that calls
IJs the attorney general’s delegates also tells them to “exercise their
independent judgment and discretion” and “take any action
consistent with their authorities under the Act and the regulations as
13
is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case.” As
Professor Legomsky acknowledges, DOJ efforts to influence specific
14
BIA or IJ decisions are “rare.” Moreover, IJs have not been subject
15
to the ideological housecleaning that hit the BIA in 2002. Legomsky
is likely correct that the 2002 incident keeps IJs aware that someone
may be looking over their shoulders as well, but, as Professor Baum
16
notes, if IJs acted based on pervasive fear of intrusions upon their
decisionmaking autonomy, one would expect uniform decisions
reflecting agency priorities, not the major disparities in asylum

11. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 9, at 14 (“[I]t is a . . . long-established principle that
administrative law judges must be exempt from . . . agency administered performance
evaluations . . . to ensure their independence in decision-making. Despite this well-established
benchmark in administrative adjudications, the first item on the Attorney General’s 22-point
plan is to subject Immigration Judges to . . . performance evaluations.” (footnote omitted)); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2006) (stating that an agency adjudicator “may not be responsible to
or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance
of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency”); VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 8 (2008) (noting that
section 554(d) of the APA expressly prohibits the supervision of ALJs by agency employees
who perform investigative or prosecutorial functions).
12. Marks, supra note 9, at 4.
13. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(ii).
14. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1667.
15. Id. at 1670; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 375–77 (2006) (recounting that the attorney general’s reduction of
BIA positions in 2002 fell most heavily upon BIA members most sympathetic to immigrant
claims).
16. Baum, supra note 3, at 1529–31.
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decisions documented by the Government Accountability Office,
18
and
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC),
19
Professor Jaya Ramji-Nogales and her colleagues.
Moreover, an informed public expects immigration courts to
function as impartial courts. Perhaps the most notable thing about
20
Monica Goodling and Kyle Sampson’s illegally hiring IJs was the
widespread hostile reaction it engendered and the correction that the
21
DOJ quickly put into place. And the DOJ report on the incident
shows that Goodling and Sampson’s goal was not to influence
immigration removal adjudication but rather to find jobs for
22
conservative party loyalists. Still, even if Goodling and Sampson did
not know what IJs do, evidence suggests that their appointees have
23
ruled against asylum seekers more than other judges on their courts.
In short, the role conflict created by the current arrangement and
the possibility that some future administration could unleash its own
Goodlings and Sampsons to meddle in the courts make a strong case
for statutorily removing the IJs from DOJ management and
oversight. Professor Legomsky wisely recommends APA protection

17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS
AND JUDGES 7–8 (2008) (reporting a considerable variation in asylum decisions across
immigration courts and judges).
18. See, e.g., TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, LATEST DATA FROM
IMMIGRATION COURTS SHOW DECLINE IN ASYLUM DISPARITY (2009), http://www.trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/209 (documenting reduced, though still significant, disparities in asylum
decisions).
19. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette, in
REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM 9, 34–52, 77–86 (2009). Ramji-Nogales and her colleagues initially identified these
disparities in an earlier version of Refugee Roulette. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz
& Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295,
328–49 (2007).
20. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1665–67 (discussing the DOJ’s BIA member and IJ
hiring practices).
21. See id. at 1665 (discussing the DOJ’s response to the politicized hiring allegations).
22. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 117–18, 121–22
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf (analyzing Goodling and
Sampson’s conduct in the selection of IJ and BIA candidates).
23. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Vetted Judges More Likely to Reject Asylum Bids, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2008, at A17 (describing an analysis of DOJ data that showed several of the politically
selected judges to be among the least likely IJs to grant asylum).
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rather than renewable terms, which would be the likely arrangement
24
were IJs placed in an Article I court.
I see one drawback, however, to an immigration trial bench in a
freestanding executive branch agency. It relates to funding. Lack of
resources understandably gets first billing in Professor
25
Legomsky’s —and almost everyone else’s—catalog of immigration
court problems. Current funding provides insufficient staff support
services and allows too few IJs for the number of cases, causing a
distressingly high caseload per judge. In 2008, IJs averaged more than
1,500 receipts, including about 1,300 proceedings, with considerable
26
variation—proceedings per judge varied from 337 to 3,504.
The ultimate source of funds for EOIR, of course, is Congress,
not the DOJ. The DOJ requests and administers the funds Congress
provides, generally within the limits Congress specifies. IJs have been
relentless in criticizing the DOJ, for example, for “fiscal cutbacks to
27
critical immigration court resources, including training programs,”
and “EOIR’s failure to provide the resources necessary for timely
28
adjudications.” But moving immigration courts out of the DOJ,
while sparing them what Professor Legomsky calls “the Justice
29
Department’s budgetary and logistical pressures,” would subject
them to the Darwinian process by which agencies compete for
funding. First, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) trims
agency funding requests for inclusion in the president’s executivebranch–wide appropriations request. Once the president submits that
request to Congress, agencies compete for funds with other agencies,
under the jurisdiction of whatever appropriations subcommittees to
which the House and Senate leadership has assigned them. Some
freestanding executive branch adjudicative bodies have apparently

24. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1679 (“[T]hough Article I judges might enjoy greater
job security than immigration judges currently do, they might actually have less job security
than they would under an ALJ model.”).
25. Id. at 1651–57.
26. These calculations, Russell R. Wheeler, IJ Receipt Data (Jan. 13, 2010) (unpublished
spreadsheet, on file with the Duke Law Journal), are based on the 224 judges listed on the
EOIR website and receipt and other data reported in the EOIR 2008 Statistical Year Book. See
EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR Immigration Court Listing, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (listing all IJs); EOIR, supra note 5, at B2 fig.1,
B7 figs.2 & 3 (listing total immigration court receipts and total immigration court proceedings).
27. Letter from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges, to
Senator Edward Kennedy (Mar. 26, 2008) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
28. Marks, supra note 9, at 13.
29. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1686.
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done fairly well in the appropriations process, no doubt in part
because they have politically sympathetic clienteles, such as veterans,
or politically popular missions, such as uniform application of the tax
laws. Query, though, the fate of a freestanding body devoted solely to
immigrant removal litigation, especially to the extent that the
appropriators perceive its clientele as undocumented aliens whom the
government wants out of the country.
As uncomfortable as IJs may be under the DOJ’s budgetary
umbrella, that situation—at least with a DOJ committed to ensuring
their effective operation—may be preferable to swimming alone, first
in OMB’s budget-hawk review, and then in a hostile congressional
environment. By analogy, in 1993, federal defenders, who chafe at
being under the budgetary umbrella of the federal judges on the
Judicial Conference of the United States, proposed the
“establish[ment] within the judicial branch [but independent of the
30
Conference] of a Center for Federal Criminal Defender Services.”
31
The Judicial Conference rejected the proposal,
reasoning,
“[n]otwithstanding the importance of the Sixth Amendment
and . . . programs [to implement it for indigent federal offenders], the
fact of the matter is that these programs are unpopular and have no
‘constituency,’ no power base, and no better champion than the
32
judiciary.” That statement describes immigration courts, except that
they have no champion other than proimmigrant lobbying groups that
have had little effect in getting EOIR the resources it needs.
B. A New Article III Court for Immigration Appeals
Professor Legomsky would also eliminate the current two-stage
appellate process by abolishing the BIA and vesting sole appellate
jurisdiction in a new U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration (CAI)
comprising sitting district judges, and perhaps some circuit judges,
assigned to the court full-time for a period of two to three years. The
proposal, however, presents some serious practical problems that
would make enactment and, in the event of enactment,

30. COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVS., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER SERVICES TO THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ACT REVIEW COMMITTEE 14, 15 (1993) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
31. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1993), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/judconf/93-Mar.pdf.
32. COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVS., supra note 30, at 15.
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implementation, very difficult. These practical, devil-in-the-details
problems show the difficulty of crafting a coherent structure for
immigration adjudication, especially in an era of polarized politics.
Professor Legomsky’s CAI presents several advantages. It would
likely shorten appellate review of removal orders by eliminating one
of the two steps currently available. It would also import needed
values into removal adjudication appellate review (keeping in mind
Professor Baum’s caution that other specialized courts have not
33
always lived up to their creators’ expectations ). It would provide
more independent decisionmakers. It would provide both a generalist
and specialized perspective, given the Article III experience
34
requirements and the relatively short CAI term of service. Interest
groups could shape the CAI’s decisions by influencing the selection of
its judges only if they made views on immigration law and policy part
of the nomination and confirmation process for all district and circuit
35
judge vacancies. Baum also notes, though, that concentrating
appeals in a specialized court can affect the perspectives of its
36
judges, which is perhaps a special consideration for the CAI, given
that almost all of its members would be district judges with no
experience with removal adjudication. The CAI’s jurisdiction would
embrace that currently exercised by the BIA, allowing the CAI to
37
hear appeals now walled off from regional appellate court review.
1. Estimating the Number of CAI Judgeships Needed. The first
problem facing the creators of the CAI would be figuring out how
many judges it would need to function. Estimating the number of
appeals that would reach it—and how many of those appeals could be
terminated procedurally—would be hard. Moreover, the Judicial
Conference’s method for estimating the number of circuit judges
necessary for a given caseload is rudimentary at best.
Professor Legomsky’s draft bill would direct the Judicial
Conference to recommend to Congress the number of judges for the

33. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1542 & n.197 (offering the example that executive branch
officials often staff specialized courts based on patronage considerations, rather than policy
interests).
34. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1692–93.
35. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1529 (noting that judicial decisionmaking is more effectively
influenced through ex ante selection than through ex post mechanisms).
36. See id. at 1535 (explaining that concentration of a type of case is likely to produce
increased uniformity in legal interpretation and greater susceptibility to external influence).
37. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1663.
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CAI and would require each circuit council to select life-tenured
judges within the circuit to serve on it for a two-year period. The
judges would be drawn from each circuit in proportion to the
percentage that each circuit’s judges comprise all district and circuit
38
judges nationally. The Conference would also recommend how
many additional district and circuit judgeships Congress should create
to compensate the courts for the judges serving temporarily on the
CAI, factoring into its calculation the reduced court of appeals
39
caseload due to the elimination of BIA appeals.
Predicting with much precision the number of judges needed to
staff the CAI would be no easy task. For the rough calculations that
follow, I draw data from 2008, 2009, and 2010 sources, as available. I
also use, when possible, data that give the benefit of the doubt to
Professor Legomsky’s proposal.
Estimating the likely caseload of the CAI starts with the 30,435
appeals of IJ decisions and 1,997 appeals of DHS decisions that the
40
BIA received in 2008. Professor Legomsky notes various factors that
could affect whether the CAI could expect similar filing levels, such
41
as national economic upturns or downturns. Decisions of a national
corps of properly resourced ALJIs might command more respect than
42
do current IJ decisions and thus might decrease appeals. Conversely,
though, a CAI perceived as more competent than the BIA might
cause an alien to rethink the cost-benefit calculus for taking an
appeal. An alien unwilling to bear the costs of a stopover at the BIA
and a further appeal to a regional appellate court might be willing to
spend the money for a one-shot appeal to the CAI. And incipient
efforts to promote more and better representation—pro bono and
43
otherwise —could increase the appeal rate.

38. Id. at 1715.
39. Id. at 1714–15.
40. EOIR, supra note 5, at S2.
41. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1698–99.
42. Id. at 1700.
43. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Deepening the Legal Profession’s Pro Bono
Commitment to the Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 453–59 (2009) (discussing
efforts to increase and improve representation of immigrants in New York City). For the
reports of three task forces that Judge Katzmann has assembled to enhance pro bono and paid
representation of aliens in immigration adjudication in New York City, see Jennifer L. Colyer et
al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
461 (2009); Claudia Slovinsky, Introduction, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 515 (2009); Jojo Annobil, The
Immigration Representation Project: Meeting the Critical Needs of Low-Wage and Indigent New
Yorkers Facing Removal, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 517 (2009); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to
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Thus, without more definitive information, the BIA’s 32,432
cases in 2008 can serve as a tenuous predictor of the CAI’s caseload.
The CAI would probably terminate more than half of those cases
procedurally. In 2008, 48 percent of the courts of appeals’
44
terminations were procedural. Appellate staff disposed of over
15,000 of the 27,161 procedural terminations with no judicial
involvement. Judge time spent on the roughly 12,000 other
procedural terminations was considerably less than that devoted to
45
the 29,608 merits terminations. The rate of procedural terminations
46
for administrative appeals, almost all of which are BIA appeals, was
about the same for all types of cases. Available data do not indicate
whether, within the category of administrative appeals, BIA appeals
had higher rates of procedural terminations than did appeals from
other agencies.
The proportion of staff-dominated procedural terminations
would probably go up in a CAI that received the total BIA caseload,
because it is quite likely that many cases that would have been
terminated procedurally never made it from the BIA to the courts of
appeals. Also, the CAI caseload would not include as many timeconsuming cases as are on the dockets of the regional courts of
appeals. On the other hand, those dockets have substantial numbers
47
of what are, to use Professor Baum’s term, “easy cases.” Of the
29,608 court of appeals merits terminations in 2008, almost a quarter
were either prisoner cases or mostly undemanding original

Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A
Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541 (2009); Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigrant Legal
Service Providers: Inadequate Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 577
(2009). Other pro bono representation projects are active around the country. For example,
there are projects in Houston, see ABA, South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Representation Project
(ProBAR), http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/probar.shtml (last visited Mar. 20,
2010); San Diego, see ABA, Immigration Justice Project of San Diego, http://new.abanet.org/
Immigration/Pages/ImmigrationJusticeProject.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2010); and Florida, see
Fla. Immigrant Advocacy Ctr., Mission Statement, http://www.fiacfla.org/mission.php (last
visited Mar. 20, 2010).
44. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 84 tbl.B-1 (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (showing that 2,327 cases
were disposed of by consolidation and that a handful of procedural terminations involved cross
appeals).
45. See id. at 115 tbl.B-5A.
46. See id. at 84 tbl.B-1, 96 tbl.B-3.
47. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1508 (characterizing easy cases as those with “one obvious
outcome under the law”).

WHEELER IN FINAL

3/30/2010 6:43:40 AM

1858

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1847

48

proceedings. And not all immigration cases are easy cases; this is
especially true of asylum cases, which require appellate judges to
determine whether substantial evidence supports IJ decisions about
witness credibility.
With all of these imponderables, a CAI in 2010 would—based on
conservative estimates—terminate about ten thousand cases on the
merits and twenty thousand procedurally, with most of these
procedural terminations requiring little, if any, judge time. For the
analysis that follows, I consider only the roughly estimated ten
thousand merits terminations per year. How many judges would the
CAI need to handle those cases, and thus how many new judgeships
should Congress create to compensate the district and appellate
courts for loaning their judges to the new court? Were Congress
serious about creating a one-step immigration appellate process and
assigning it to a single Article III court, Congress would probably
expect that court to handle its cases in pretty much the same fashion
that the regional appellate courts handle their cases—through threejudge panels. (I recognize, though, Professor Baum’s point that
Congress might prescribe rules and procedures to favor the
49
government. ) The BIA in 2009 disposed of 94 percent of its cases
50
through one-member, usually very short, decisions, and Professor
51
Legomsky documents the problems this arrangement creates.
Appellate review in an Article III court is a different animal than in
the BIA—the courts of appeals in 2008 averaged 340 terminations per
52
53
judgeship nationwide versus a BIA member’s 2,500 per year. And,
54
although the BIA heard oral argument in only one case in 2009, the
courts of appeals, based on admittedly limited data, probably give

48. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 44, at 84 tbl.B-1. Original
proceedings are principally petitions for various writs that originate in the courts of appeals and
petitions to file second or successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
49. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1560 (describing specialized courts’ substantive and
procedural rules as a mechanism of ex ante congressional control).
50. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1657.
51. See id. at 1664–65 (explaining that single-member decisions increase the probability of
errors, subjective biases, and inconsistency).
52. This figure is calculated based on data in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra
note 44, at 84 tbl.B-1.
53. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1654.
54. Id. at 1707.
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oral argument to somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of BIA
55
56
appeals, versus 30 percent across the entire caseload.
How many judges would the CAI need to give adequate
attention to ten thousand merits panel cases from the immigration
courts? The starting point is to determine the number of regional
appellate court judges who terminated 29,608 merits panel cases in
57
2008. It is difficult, though, to pin down that number. There are
always vacancies in the regional appellate courts’ 167 statutorily
authorized judgeships (an unusually high eighteen in mid-March
58
2010 ). And although senior judges in 2009 participated in 17.8
59
percent of all oral arguments and submissions of briefs, and
seventeen active circuit and 186 active district judges sat temporarily
60
in the courts of appeals in 2008, there is no published figure as to the
number of “full-time–equivalent” judges these judges represent.
Furthermore, although the Judicial Conference has a fairly
sophisticated system in place to weigh the judicial demands presented
by different types of district cases, it does not have a reliable method
of weighting appellate cases according to the judge time they
61
demand. If it had such a system for appellate cases, the Conference
55. A Second Circuit judge estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of BIA appeals
receive oral argument. Robert A. Katzmann, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Remarks at the Brookings Institution’s Judicial Issues Forum: Immigration and the Courts 56
(Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0220_
immigration/20080220_immigration.pdf. One Ninth Circuit judge said there is oral argument in
“less than 20%” of BIA appeals, Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 182 (2006) (letter of Sidney R. Thomas, J., U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/
109hrg/28339.pdf, and another said approximately 10 percent “proceeded to merits panels of
three judges” in 2005, id. at 51 (statement of Carlos T. Bea, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit).
56. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 44, at 84 tbl.B-1 (citing 8,983
cases terminated after oral hearing, out of 29,608 total cases terminated on the merits).
57. Id.
58. U.S. Courts, Judicial Vacancies, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialvac.cfm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2010).
59. U.S. Courts, Work of Senior Judges Provides Much Help, http://www.uscourts.gov/
newsroom/2010/SeniorJudges.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
60. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 44, at 404 tbl.V-2.
61. See PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003-2004
DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9–21 (2005) (discussing the goals and limitations of a
method for calculating district case weights to replace the outdated set then in use). But see
WILLIAM O. JENKINS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-09-1050T, FEDERAL
JUDGESHIPS: THE GENERAL ACCURACY OF DISTRICT AND APPELLATE JUDGESHIP CASE-
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could apply the weights assigned to BIA appeals to the BIA’s roughly
thirty thousand IJ appeals to obtain at least a rough estimate of the
number of judges needed for the CAI. The current 167 court of
appeals judgeships are a product of rough statistical estimates (“a
standard of 500 filings . . . per panel and with pro se appeals weighted
62
as one third of a case” ) as applied in 1990 (the most recent year
Congress created new appellate judgeships) along with a variety of
other factors, including the refusal of some appellate courts to request
additional judgeships that their increased caseloads would justify.
Given the lack of empirical guidance, a tenuous assumption is
that forty judges would be needed to handle the ten thousand or so
merits panel cases that would come to the CAI from the immigration
courts. This is a conservative estimate, which allows 250 merits
terminations per CAI judgeship, compared to 172 per judgeship in
the regional courts of appeals in 2008, and does not include any judge
time for procedural terminations. Assume as well that the Conference
would ask Congress to create forty additional judgeships to replace
the judges assigned to the CAI. (Professor Legomsky would tell the
Conference to factor in the appellate work reduction from the
absence of BIA appeals; however, for reasons explained below, that
would be difficult to do from a practical standpoint.)
2. Enacting the Judgeship Legislation. Congress has not enacted
63
an omnibus (that is, judiciary-wide) judgeship bill since 1990,
although it has created a handful of district judgeships, principally in
64
the districts along the border with Mexico. Repeated attempts to
enact an omnibus bill have failed, and prospects are not great for the
RELATED WORKLOAD MEASURES 3–4 (2009) (arguing that the methodology used to estimate
judicial case weights was inadequate).
62. Federal Judgeship Act of 2008: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 427 (2008) (statement of George Z. Singal, C.J., U.S. District Court for the District of
Maine).
63. See Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
64. E.g., 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, § 312, 116 Stat. 1758, 1786–88 (2002) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133
(2006)) (adding additional permanent district judgeships for, among other districts, the Western
District of Texas, as well as additional temporary district judgeships for, among other districts,
the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, and the Eastern District of Texas); Federal
Funding, Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 305, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-84 to -85 (2000)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2006)) (adding additional district judgeships for,
among other districts, the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, and the Western
District of Texas).
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omnibus judgeship bill introduced in the 111th Congress, which
embodies the Judicial Conference’s request for sixty-nine new
65
judgeships—twelve circuit and fifty-seven district judgeships.
Prospects for enactment of the CAI would be hindered by three
factors: costs, the polarized politics of judicial selection, and
resistance from federal judges.
a. Costs of the Judgeships. Congress generally requires that most
direct spending increases be offset by revenue increases or reductions
66
in other spending—“PAYGO” in shorthand. Professor Legomsky
asserts that his proposal would generate savings from four sources:
(1) the economy that would result, on a case-by-case basis, from
review in the CAI as opposed to the BIA, based on lower salaries of
federal court clerks and staff attorneys compared to BIA staff
attorneys; (2) savings to the judicial branch from the elimination of
BIA appeals in the regional courts of appeals; (3) savings to the DOJ
for the same reason; and (4) reduced DHS costs of detaining aliens
due to a reduction in elapsed time from removal order to appellate
67
determination. He argues that although his cost analysis is crude,
“the proposal would substantially reduce the total fiscal cost of
68
appellate review of removal orders.” With deference, most of these
cost savings are illusory, because the question is not whether the
proposal would reduce the cost of appellate review of removal orders
but rather whether the proposal would reduce overall spending by the
agencies currently involved in BIA and regional appellate review of
removal orders. Except for reduced detention costs, I see no
appreciable savings.
First, the costs of operating a forty-judge CAI would, based on
my estimates, be about the same as operating the BIA. As Professor
Legomsky notes, the EOIR cannot specify how much of its roughly
three-hundred-million-dollar budget goes to the BIA. Given this
somewhat surprising fact, the next-best option is an estimate based on
information that the DOJ has published and information that the
EOIR has released. Legomsky makes a convincing case that the costs
to maintain a BIA member are higher than those to maintain a
65. See Federal Judgeship Act of 2009, S. 1653, 111th Cong. (2009); Federal Judgeship Act
of 2009, H.R. 3662, 111th Cong. (2009).
66. For the most recent enactment, see Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-139, tit. I, 124 Stat. 8 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
67. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1696–1703.
68. Id. at 1702.
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district or circuit judge, because the principal-to-staff ratio is much
greater for the BIA than for circuit or district judges, and BIA staff
attorneys earn considerably more than Article III judges’ chambers
69
clerks and the courts’ staff attorneys. But that fact appears to lose
relevance given even my conservative estimate of a forty-judge CAI.
I developed cost estimates using the salary and personnel data
70
that the EOIR provided to Professor Legomsky, fiscal and personnel
data posted on the DOJ website, and assumptions about staffing
levels within the components of the EOIR and those units’
71
comparative expenditures on travel and contractors. My estimates of
the costs are: the BIA, about $96 million; the immigration courts,
about $119 million; the chief administrative hearing officer (a small
cadre of APA ALJs within the EOIR), about $8 million; and the
director and other management units within the EOIR, about $78
72
million.
Then, using data provided by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts on the estimated annual recurring cost of maintaining a
district or circuit judge, including salaries and benefits of judges and
73
their chambers staff, and the operating costs for the chambers, along
with additional personnel and cost data in the Administrative Office’s
74
“Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification,” I estimated

69. Id. at 1696–98.
70. Id. at 1652 n.73.
71. The Justice Department data I used are available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011
justification/, under the heading Administrative Review and Appeals, which embraces EOIR
and the Office of the Pardon Attorney. The pardon attorney budget, however, is so small—
around two million dollars of a roughly three-hundred-million-dollar budget—as to have no
discernable impact on my estimates, and I eliminated pardon attorney costs whenever they were
specified. The Word document (“fy11-ara justification.doc”) provides some structural
information. The Excel spreadsheet (“fy11-ara justification-exhibits.xls”) provides, at Exhibit I,
“Detail of Permanent Positions by Category,” information on the number of attorneys,
paralegals, and other employees within the EOIR. Exhibit L, “Summary of Requirements by
Object Class,” identifies how much the EOIR planned to spend in 2010 in various expense
categories, such as rent payments to the General Services Administration, “[o]ther services”
(that is, contractors, such as, I assume, translators), and equipment maintenance.
72. My Excel spreadsheets with these cost estimates are on file with the Duke Law Journal.
Russell R. Wheeler, EOIR CAI Budget Estimate (Jan. 13, 2010) (unpublished spreadsheet, on
file with the Duke Law Journal). Thanks to Norman Baker of the Federal Judicial Center for
calling my attention to sources used in these cost estimates.
73. Telephone Interview with Penny Fleming, Chief, Financial Liaison & Analysis Office,
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 14, 2010). To be precise, the estimates are $980,000 for a
circuit judgeship and $981,000 for a district judgeship.
74. This document, on file with the Duke Law Journal, presents backup information to
support the judicial branch’s annual appropriations request. I used information at page 10 of the
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the cost of a forty-judge U.S. appellate court, with a full complement
of chambers law clerks and staff attorneys, to be about $105 million.
Because judges on a court doing only immigration appeals might not
need a full complement of law clerks and staff attorneys, I reduced
the number of these staff members, for a revised estimate of about
$92 million.
Professor Legomsky’s second and third sources of asserted cost
savings come from eliminating the current round of BIA appeals in
the regional appellate courts. It is true that under his proposal the
judicial branch would no longer dispose of ten thousand or so annual
BIA appeals, and the DOJ would no longer litigate them, but it
hardly follows that spending by the judicial branch or the DOJ would
decrease proportionately. Just as the courts of appeals have adjusted
their procedures to handle the increase in BIA and other appeals with
no corresponding increase in judgeships, they would use the judge
and staff time previously devoted to BIA appeals to handle increased
filings in other areas, and, perhaps, to ratchet back somewhat the use
of truncated procedures—perhaps by granting oral argument or
writing published opinions in a few more cases than they otherwise
could. Likewise, were BIA appeals to go away, the DOJ would not
fire the attorneys who litigated those appeals but rather would deploy
them to other litigation, including perhaps an appellate process in the
CAI that might be more demanding of lawyers than that of the BIA.
The only tangible savings from adoption of Professor
Legomsky’s proposal arise from the reduction in the amount of time
aliens in removal proceedings would spend in detention due to the
likely decrease in elapsed time from IJ order to appellate disposition.
I cannot say, though, as Legomsky does, that those savings would be
“significant,” however that is defined.
b. Polarized Judicial Appointment Politics. The politics of
judicial appointments creates another impediment to the creation of
the CAI. The judgeship bills now before Congress have no
Republican cosponsors because the judgeships would be in place
upon enactment for President Obama to try to fill. In 2007, a similar
bill had bipartisan support, in part because it provided that the
judgeships would not be effective until January 20, 2009. Bipartisan

“Summary” (“Comparative Summary of Obligations by Object Classification”), and at page 5.9
(“Summary of Personal Compensation and Benefits by Activity”).
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support, though, did not produce a judgeship bill for President Bush
to sign.
Creating forty judgeships—even if only to provide the district
and appellate courts with sufficient numbers to stock the CAI—
would nevertheless allow the current president to change the overall
makeup of the judiciary as represented by the party of the appointing
president. And, if the immigration court caseload were to decline, the
size of the CAI could be reduced, moving more of these appointees
back to the circuit and district courts. Moreover, although Professor
Legomsky assumes that “each circuit would contribute district and
circuit judges proportionately to the total number of district and
75
circuit judges in that circuit,” his draft bill does not require the
appointment of circuit judges to the new court. It simply requires the
assignment of “the number of judges that is proportional to the total
number of authorized article III circuit and district judgeships in such
76
circuit.” Quite likely there would be pressure in the judicial councils
77
(all of which have a one-circuit-judge majority) to draw judges
exclusively from the district courts, on the view that the court of
appeals needs additional judgeships more than some of the circuit’s
less-busy district courts. And, given that the additional circuit judges
might not be assigned to the new court, the party out of power will
resist the bill because it would change the party-of-appointingpresident composition of the courts of appeals.
c. Resistance from Federal Judges.
Professor Legomsky’s
proposal would have to overcome stiff resistance from the judicial
branch itself. First, its passage would likely doom any chance that
Congress would also enact the long-overdue omnibus judgeship bill,
which already faces stiff headwinds. If the president and his
supporters could persuade Congress to give the president or his
successor forty more judgeships to fill, it is highly unlikely that they
could persuade Congress to create still another large group of
judgeships. Congress, remember, has refused to enact an omnibus
judgeship bill since 1990. Judges might also resist creation of
75. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1686–87.
76. Stephen H. Legomsky, Second Draft of Proposed Bill for Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication § 3(a) (Jan. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (proposing amendments to section 242 of the INA).
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1) (2006) (creating judicial councils “consisting of the chief
judge of the circuit, who shall preside, and an equal number of circuit judges and district
judges”).
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additional judgeships to stock the CAI—as opposed to providing
omnibus judgeship relief that the judges themselves have requested—
because at least some judges believe that doing so would, in Justice
Frankfurter’s words, “result, by its own Gresham’s law, in a
depreciation of the judicial currency and the consequent impairment
78
of the prestige and of the efficacy of the federal courts.”
Second, federal judges would object to the prospect of an
assignment they did not anticipate when they accepted their judicial
appointment—a steady diet of immigration cases, the possibility of
temporary relocation to another city (or travel to the court site
mainly for relatively rare hearings), lost personal interaction with
colleagues, and a concern that their generalist judicial skills would
atrophy during their two-year exile. Professor Legomsky says that
“some of these disadvantages are minor and . . . others are easily
79
remedied.” I am not so sure. It is true that few circuit judges reside
near their court’s headquarters. But, unlike established regional
appellate court judges, the members of the CAI would probably want
a lot of personal interaction, especially because they would be almost
all trial judges in a new role (deciding appeals) in an area of the law
that would be new and arcane to them.
Finally, there is no guarantee that Congress, if it created the
CAI, would indeed provide the circuit and district judgeships
necessary to compensate for judges assigned to the new court (in part
because the Judicial Conference lacks the tools to make a solid
80
empirical case for its recommendation ). As Professor Baum
81
explains, Senator Specter’s short-lived 2006 bill to transfer all BIA
appeals to the Federal Circuit would have provided only three more
judges for that court, which would have been overwhelmed by the
caseload. The overall court of appeals caseload would no longer
include BIA appeals (10,280 in 2008), but that benefit would not be
felt evenly in all courts—or at all in the district courts.

78. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
79. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1706.
80. See Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The Federal Judgeship Act
of 2008: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 90, 92 (2008) (statement of
William O. Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability
Office) (stating that “there is no empirical bases or [sic] assessing the potential accuracy of
adjusted case filings as a measure of case-related judge workload”—the measure upon which
the Judicial Conference based its recommendation).
81. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1557 (discussing Senator Specter’s proposal).
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3. Implementing the New Court. Table 1 shows the contribution,
82
according to Professor Legomsky’s formula, expected from each
circuit to a forty-judge CAI, in descending order of contribution. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has 16.39 percent of all circuit and district
judgeships. Applying this percentage to a forty-judge CAI, the Ninth
Circuit would have to contribute 6.55 judges. The circuit’s 107 district
judgeships and twenty-nine circuit judgeships constitute 78.68 and
21.32 percent, respectively, of the circuit’s 136 total judgeships. So,
with rounding, the Ninth Circuit would get five new district
judgeships and one new circuit judgeship.
The numbers suggest some logistical difficulties facing the
Judicial Conference and Congress in creating additional judgeships
and the circuit councils in making assignments to the CAI.
Table 1. Judgeship Allocations to the Circuits to Support a FortyJudge CAI
A
Circuit
9
5
11
6
2
3
4
7
8
10
1
DC

B
DJs
107
82
67
62
62
59
55
47
41
37
29
15
663

C
CJs
29
17
12
16
13
14
15
11
11
12
6
11
167

D
Total
136
99
79
78
75
73
70
58
52
49
35
26
830

E
% DJs
78.68%
82.83%
84.81%
79.49%
82.67%
80.82%
78.57%
81.03%
78.85%
75.51%
82.86%
57.69%
79.88%

F
% CJs
21.32%
17.17%
15.19%
20.51%
17.33%
19.18%
21.43%
18.97%
21.15%
24.49%
17.14%
42.31%
20.12%

G
% all Js
16.39%
11.93%
9.52%
9.40%
9.04%
8.80%
8.43%
6.99%
6.27%
5.90%
4.22%
3.13%
100.00%

H
All Js
6.55
4.77
3.81
3.76
3.61
3.52
3.37
2.80
2.51
2.36
1.69
1.25
40.00

I
DJs
5.16
3.95
3.23
2.99
2.99
2.84
2.65
2.27
1.98
1.78
1.40
0.72
31.95

J
CJs
1.40
0.82
0.58
0.77
0.63
0.67
0.72
0.53
0.53
0.58
0.29
0.53
8.05

Professor Legomsky proposes that the Conference, in
recommending the number of judgeships necessary to compensate for
those assigned to the CAI, reduce that number to reflect the
83
elimination of BIA appeals in the regional courts of appeals.
Column J shows that the Ninth Circuit would get one additional
circuit judge (rounding down from 1.4). But how might the
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1714–15.
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Conference adjust the smaller fractions produced by the application
of the formula?
Second, the bill directs assignments to the new court “in
accordance with the formula . . . with reasonable adjustments for
84
rounding.” It would be easy enough to round the number of judges
that each circuit would contribute to the new court (column H)—
seven from the Ninth Circuit, five from the Fifth, and so on. But
where would Congress place the compensating judgeships without
knowing whether the judicial councils would assign any circuit judges
to the new court or from which districts the councils would select
judges for CAI assignment? (Every circuit but the District of
Columbia has more districts than the number of judges it would
receive, as column H of Table 1 shows.) It is unlikely, given senators’
desire to control patronage, that Congress would authorize district
judgeships for a circuit but let the circuit council determine where to
assign them.
For illustration, assume that, as of early 2010, Congress had
created the CAI along with eight additional circuit judgeships and
thirty-two additional district judgeships. Assume as well that one of
the eight circuit judgeships was for the Fourth Circuit. Because the
Fourth Circuit’s court of appeals has three vacancies (as of mid85
March 2010), the circuit council would be unlikely to loan an
appellate judge to the CAI unless statutorily mandated to do so.
Thus, the council would have to turn to the district courts to find the
three judges that the formula demands it contribute to the CAI. But if
the Fourth Circuit received one circuit judgeship, it could not receive
all three district judgeships to which its formula-based 2.65 district
judgeships, when rounded, would entitle it because it is entitled to
only three additional judgeships overall.
In a rational world, Congress would assign the Fourth Circuit’s
two additional district judges to its largest districts—Eastern Virginia
(currently eleven judgeships) and either Maryland or South Carolina
(currently ten judgeships each)—on the view that the larger the court,
the easier it is to part with a judgeship for two years because there are
more judges to fill in to handle the docket. It is true that, under
Professor Legomsky’s proposal, the district loaning a judgeship to the
CAI may have received an additional judgeship to compensate it for
the loan. But the districts may have other vacancies: Eastern Virginia,
84. Legomsky, supra note 76, § 3(a).
85. U.S. Courts, supra note 58.
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with twelve judgeships under the hypothetical CAI statute, would
have an easier time covering its docket, even with one judgeship
temporarily assigned to the CAI and another vacant (as it has been
since May 2007), than would a six-judgeship Eastern North Carolina,
with one of the six loaned to the CAI and another vacant (as it has
been since December 2005).
Which districts would actually get the judgeships, however, might
well turn on which legislators from the Fourth Circuit’s five states are
best positioned to influence the legislation. Regardless, the circuit
council would need to find one judge for the CAI from a district that
did not receive an additional judgeship.
Moreover, what happens once the judges first assigned to the
CAI complete their two-year term? Would their districts, or at least
the two that received the additional judgeships, be obliged to send
two other judges to the CAI, rather than have the council turn to
districts that did not receive additional judgeships? If so, would the
courts that received the additional judgeships become the permanent
loaner courts for the CAI? What effect would that have on whether
would-be judges in those districts would seek or accept nominations
as district judges, knowing that they would likely be tapped for a stint
on the CAI sometime after three years of service? Furthermore, these
hypotheticals assume that the president has nominated and the
Senate has confirmed the additional judges for the new seats created
to stock the CAI. In today’s climate of polarized judicial
appointments politics, that assumption is highly risky.
C. Final Observation
Professor Legomsky’s proposal brings some much-needed fresh
thinking to the debate over immigration adjudication reform. He has
tried to fashion a compromise that would satisfy all—or at least
most—stakeholders in this debate. But, especially in today’s
dysfunctional political environment, the whole concept of a CAI
presents too many cost and logistical obstacles. Converting IJs to
ALJs in an independent agency might be more likely to be enacted
than creating the CAI, but doing so might make it harder to obtain
resources for the ALJIs, and resources, rather than organizational
placement, are the main barrier to consistently effective IJ
performance.
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II. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO IMPROVING
THE IMMIGRATION COURTS
Immigration courts—for all the ink devoted to them in recent
years—have been subjected to rather narrow analyses of how they
function as courts, and there has been little effort to learn how lessons
gleaned about the ingredients for effective courts might be applied to
immigration courts. I focus on immigration courts because they are
where the litigation journey ends for the great majority of individuals
86
in removal proceedings.
Given barriers to major structural change, perhaps the best hope
for improvement in immigration adjudication at the first-instance
level is for a new DOJ approach to immigration court management.
Expecting this may be as implausible as expecting major structural
changes—and, as Professor Legomsky explains, a new executive
branch policy could be ephemeral, good only until the next attorney
87
general takes over —but it is better than not trying anything. And
this new approach to the immigration courts would also benefit a new
independent adjudicative agency, in the unlikely event that Congress
were to establish it.
In this Part, I suggest that the DOJ and the immigration courts
look to successful efforts to improve the performance of third branch
courts—defining performance broadly to include not only expeditious
case disposition, but also judges’ accountability, transparency, and
attentiveness to the needs of court users. Performance-enhancing
efforts include the identification of minimum standards of court
organization and management, the identification of minimum
standards of court performance, and efforts to change courts’
organizational culture.
A. Using Third Branch Analytic Methods and Findings to Assess and
Improve First Branch Courts
“Immigration Court basically looks, feels, and operates like most
other courts [even though] some of its characteristics strike even

86. See EOIR, supra note 5, at Y1 (“Only a relatively small percentage of immigration
judge decisions are appealed to the BIA.”).
87. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1677 (“No matter how much trust a given attorney
general might inspire among subordinates, the genie is now out of the bottle. . . . [A]ny action
the DOJ takes to restore the adjudicators’ job security can be undone at any time by a successor
administration or a successor attorney general.”).
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88

experienced litigators as foreign.” Beyond their look and feel,
though, are other factors that make immigration courts less like many
first branch courts and more like third branch courts. The Federal
Administrative Law Judges Conference Website in January 2010
reported that there are “over 1,300 Administrative Law Judges
89
assigned to 31 Federal agencies.” Excluding the Social Security
Administration’s 1,184 judges, the Labor Department’s fifty judges,
and the National Labor Relations Board’s sixty judges, agencies
90
employ between one and nineteen ALJs. A 2002 canvass identified
91
92
3,370 non-APA judges. In many, though certainly not all, of these
agencies caseloads tend to be small, although the cases are often
complex and serious, sometimes lasting for several years. Many of
these courts are based exclusively in Washington, D.C., or its suburbs.
In short, unlike most executive branch courts, the immigration
courts resemble a state trial court system or the U.S. bankruptcy
courts. Immigration courts are scattered over a large geographic
jurisdiction and have larger caseloads than most executive branch
judiciaries. IJs are specialists, as are U.S. bankruptcy judges and,
93
Professor Baum notes, many state trial judges. Furthermore, like
third branch adjudication, immigration adjudication concerns not
simply public welfare benefits, but the fundamental rights of the
litigants—especially if losing means returning to an authoritarian
regime to face persecution.
B. Standards for Assessing Courts
Efforts to change the structure and operation of third branch
courts have taken many forms, but the creation and use of minimum
standards to assess courts has been one of the most pervasive.
88. Stacy Caplow, ReNorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 87 (2008).
89. Fed. Admin. Law Judges Conference, What Is FALJC?, http://005754d.netsolhost.com/
faljc1.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). Thanks to Governance Institute research fellows Jerry
Richman and Dominic Nardi for information on administrative judges.
90. Id.
91. Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1008
(2004).
92. Veterans Law judges averaged 729 cases per judge; Social Security Administration
ALJs averaged 544 cases per judge. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ES-28 (2010), available at http://new.abanet.
org/Immigration/Documents/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutiveSummary.pdf.
93. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1532–36 (examining forms of specialization within the
judicial branch).
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Importing into immigration courts standards born outside the
administrative law context is not necessarily novel. As Professor
94
Legomsky has explained elsewhere, and Professor Jennifer Chacón
95
explains in this Symposium, Congress has been reshaping
immigration adjudication, which is technically civil and
administrative, using criminal prosecution norms such as an emphasis
on detention, albeit without adopting parallel procedural norms to
protect individual rights, such as government-provided counsel for
indigent aliens.
The challenge is to identify and apply to immigration courts
standards and analytical approaches that are more appropriate than
one-sided criminal enforcement standards. The analysis that follows is
tentative, limited, and exploratory, and I welcome comments and
challenges to it. I realize, too, that the current caseload per IJ may
make a pipe dream of this approach, including application of the
diagnostics necessary to implement it.
There are three types of third branch standards: judicial
administration standards, performance standards, and cultural
standards.
1. Judicial Administration Standards. It seems likely that how
courts are organized—for example, whether trial courts are
consolidated or dispersed and where supervisory authority is
lodged—may have some influence on courts’ ability to deliver justice
effectively, expeditiously, and economically. “Have some influence,”
however, does not mean “control entirely.”
Starting in the 1930s, the American Bar Association (ABA)
96
developed “Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration.” The
97
98
ABA approved revisions of these standards in 1974 and 1990, and

94. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007).
95. Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010).
96. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION: A SURVEY OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION FOR IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, at xxi (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949).
97. See COMM’N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT ORGANIZATION (1974).
98. See 1 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., ABA, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:
STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION (1990).
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added standards for trial courts in 1992. The standards, developed by
committees of state judges and court administrators, embrace the socalled unified court approach, in which all courts in a state are under
the administrative and rulemaking authority of the chief justice of the
100
highest state court. The highest court of the state may be roughly
analogous to the chief IJs within the EOIR. The revised standards
101
recognize as well the need for strong and collegial local leadership.
The ABA has promulgated additional standards in various relevant
areas, as have other groups. Professor Stacy Caplow referenced some
of these standards—for example, the ABA Standards for State
102
Judicial Selection—in her analysis of immigration courts. The
Arnold & Porter February 2010 report on immigration courts for the
ABA Commission on Immigration proposes performance reviews for
IJs based on ABA and Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System guidelines, along with a consolidated code of
103
conduct adapted from the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
2. Court Performance Standards. In 1990, partly in reaction to
the ABA judicial administration standards, the National Center for
104
State Courts published its Trial Court Performance Standards.
These performance standards, part of a national emphasis on
105
organizational performance measures, reflect the view that even
though the judicial administration standards state a well-informed
conventional wisdom about how to organize and manage courts, what
is ultimately important is how courts perform—whether they deliver
justice fairly and expeditiously, for example, and use taxpayer funds
responsibly.
The National Center’s standards in five performance areas are
aspirational statements of how litigants, other court users, and

99. See 2 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., ABA, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS (1992).
100. 1 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., supra note 98, at 3–4.
101. See id. at 3–5 (“All judges throughout the system should have a voice in
policymaking . . . .”).
102. Caplow, supra note 88, at 99 & n.54.
103. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-29.
104. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2010),
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/TCPS/index.html.
105. See Richard Y. Schauffler, Judicial Accountability in the US State Courts: Measuring
Court Performance, 3 UTRECHT L. REV. 112, 113, 118–19 (2007) (explaining the political
context surrounding the push toward performance measurement in state courts).
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Table 2 provides some

Table 2. Trial Court Performance Standards
Performance Area
1. Access to Justice

2. Expedition and
Timeliness

3. Equality, Fairness, and
Integrity

4. Independence and
Accountability
5. Public Trust and
Confidence (noting that
courts have several
constituencies107)

Sample Standard
1.4 Courtesy, Responsiveness, and Respect—
Judges and other trial court personnel are
courteous and responsive to the public, and
accord respect to all with whom they come
into contact.
2.1 Case Processing—The trial court
establishes and complies with recognized
guidelines for timely case processing while, at
the same time, keeping current with its
incoming caseload.
3.4 Clarity—The trial court renders decisions
that unambiguously address the issues
presented to it and clearly indicate how
compliance will be achieved.
4.5 Responses to Change—The trial court
anticipates new conditions and adjusts its
operations as necessary.
5.3 Judicial Independence and
Accountability—The public perceives the
trial court as independent, not unduly
influenced by other components of
government, and accountable.

These standards were released with a set of instruments for
measuring court performance; however, these instruments were so
intimidating that the National Center published in 2005 a simplified
set of “CourTools”—ten core measures of court performance. These
measures include: “Access and Fairness,” “Clearance Rates,” “Time
to Disposition,” “Age of Active Pending Caseload,” “Trial Date
Certainty,” “Reliability and Integrity of Case Files,” “Court

106. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 104, at Preface.
107. Courts’ constituencies include “the vast majority of citizens and taxpayers who seldom
experience the courts directly,” “opinion leaders,” “citizens who appear before the court,”
judges and court employees, and lawyers “who may have an ‘inside’ perspective on how well the
court is performing.” Id. at Performance Area 5.
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108

Employee Satisfaction,” and “Cost per Case.” Partly in response to
a 2005 Conference of State Court Administrators call for state courts
109
to implement performance measures, individual courts and entire
state court systems have started to use the CourTools, often placing
110
the resulting scores on their public websites.
3. Court Culture. Performance standards help judges and court
managers identify how courts should perform and how to measure
whether courts are performing as they should, but they offer little
guidance about how to manage courts to achieve high performance.
This realization led to a third effort to improve state courts—analysis
of their cultures and a search for links between culture and
performance, with the goal of shifting current cultures toward those
associated with high performance.
The 2007 pathbreaking work in this area, Trial Courts as
111
Organizations, adapted analytical tools for assessing corporate
culture and put them to use in twelve trial courts in three states. Brian
Ostrom and his colleagues explained that “[a] court’s management
culture is reflected in what is valued, the norms and expectations, the
leadership style, the communication patterns, the procedures and
routines, and the definition of success that makes the court unique.
112
More simply: ‘the way things get done around here.’”
Based on a national survey of some seventy court experts, they
113
identified four court “cultural archetypes” —”communal” (which
114
prizes
“collegial
decision-making”),
“networked”
(which
115
emphasizes “creativity and innovation”), “autonomous” (which
embodies a “judicial preference for limited administrative

108. The remaining two measures—“Collection of Monetary Penalties” and “Effective Use
of Jurors”—have no applicability to immigration courts. See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts,
CourTools, http://courtools.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
109. Schauffler, supra note 105, at 121.
110. For evidence of the use of CourTools, see the site links for “State/County Specific,”
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Performance Measurement Resource Guide, http://www.ncsconline.
org/WC/CourTopics/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=CtPerS#639 (last visited Mar. 20, 2010), and see
also, for example, Utah State Courts, Utah Court Performance Measures, http://www.utcourts.
gov/courtools/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
111. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS (2007).
112. Id. at 4–5.
113. Id. at 36–38, 68–69. For a graphical summary of the attributes that Ostrom and his
colleagues associate with these archetypes, see id. at 40 tbl.2-3.
114. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted).
115. Id. at 74 (emphasis omitted).
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controls”), and “hierarchical” (in which “the chain of command is
117
clear”). They recognized that none of the archetypes would be
perfectly or exclusively represented in any court; “court culture is a
118
matter of emphasis and degree rather than perfect alignment.” To
determine each of the twelve courts’ primary cultural type and its
strength in the five performance areas, they fashioned a “Court
119
Culture Assessment Instrument” and administered it to judges with
120
a criminal docket and to senior court administrators.
Ostrom and his colleagues assessed the “performance
121
consequences” of each court’s primary culture in several of the Trial
Court Performance Standards areas. In terms of time to disposition,
they expected and found that hierarchical courts are more likely than
others to meet the ABA’s 1987 time standards for criminal felony
122
clearance rates. As for the standards of access, fairness, and
managerial effectiveness—“values [that] involve the rights and
concerns of participants in the trial process other than judges and
123
administrators” —they surveyed attorneys who practiced in the
twelve courts and found mixed results. Generally, though, both
prosecutors and defense attorneys articulated the belief that courts
with autonomous cultures have “a greater degree of access, fairness,
124
and managerial effectiveness” than courts with hierarchical cultures,
because “[a]ttorneys will see themselves as . . . having greater
access[ and] being treated more fairly, and courts acting more
effectively in cultures where the attorneys have a greater say in how
125
business is conducted.”
Ostrom and his colleagues asked judges and administrators
which cultures they preferred—that is, in what ways they might want
their courts to do business differently. They expected and found, as to
managing cases and dealing with change, that judges and
administrators generally preferred the aspects of hierarchical
culture—doing business “on the basis of clear and orderly rules,
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 79 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 84 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47–57.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 108–09.
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expertise, and modern management techniques.” As to judge-staff
relations and internal organizations, they found a preference for
networked cultures, in which business is done “on the basis of
inclusiveness. . . . [b]ecause judges and court administrators have
ongoing relationships and must consult each other to discuss ways to
implement policies, allocate resources, . . . configure court staff,” and
127
avoid “personnel conflicts.” For court leadership, they found that
judges and administrators favored a communal culture—doing court
business on a “collegial basis, where trust and mutual respect reign
128
axiomatically.” Finally, they found little interest in an autonomous
court culture.
C. Applying Standards and Assessing Cultures in Immigration Courts
From Trial Courts as Organizations and similar assessments
emerge several observations about the culture-performance link that
may be applicable to immigration courts. I hope to develop a broader
framework for analysis and a research method to determine whether
lessons learned about the organization and performance of third
branch courts might be used beneficially in and by immigration
courts. In this Section, I identify, as examples, two essential lessons
that emerge from the analysis of third branch courts—chief judge
leadership and measuring judicial performance. The “International
Framework for Court Excellence,” developed by a consortium
including members of the National Center for State Courts, several
international and foreign court organizations, and the Federal
Judicial Center, seeks to promote high performance in seven
performance areas: court management and leadership; court policies;
human, material, and financial resources; court proceedings; client
needs and satisfaction; affordable and accessible court services; and
129
public trust and confidence. The consortium’s basic conclusion is:
“To become an excellent court, proactive management and
leadership are required at all levels, not only at the top, and
performance targets have to be determined and attained. Wellinformed decision-making [about achieving high performance]

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 112.
Id. at 112–13.
Id.
INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
COURT EXCELLENCE 2, 4, 26 (2008), available at http://www.courtexcellence.com/pdf/IFCEFramework-v12.pdf.
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requires sound measurement of key performance areas and reliable
130
data.”
1. Chief Judge Leadership. One observation of third branch
courts involves the ways in which the chief judge in each multijudge
court can enhance the court’s performance by establishing policies
through collegial decisionmaking, monitoring performance, building
and sustaining morale, and searching for alternative ways for the
court and its judges to operate. This observation does not seem to
have infiltrated the EOIR or its DOJ overseers; indeed, unlike third
branch courts, multijudge immigration courts do not each have their
own chief judge.
The immigration courts currently have eight Assistant Chief IJs
(ACIJs) who are each responsible for between four and eleven
131
immigration courts, usually on a rough geographic basis. One has
responsibility, for example, for the three courts in or near New York
132
City and the court in Ulster. Another has responsibility for eleven
133
courts in Arizona, California, Nevada, Virginia, and Maryland.
Seven of these eight ACIJs are residents in one of the courts under
134
their purview,
but that leaves thirty-eight of the forty-five
multijudge courts without a chief judge as a member of the court. The
jobs of these ACIJs seem highly taxing, and the ABA’s 2010 report
135
recommends a significant increase in the number of ACIJs.
Instead of more ACIJs, though, the DOJ, the EOIR, and the
immigration courts should consider the conventional third branch
approach of a chief judge for every multijudge court, or at least for all
immigration courts with three or more judges. As of December 2009,
twenty-nine of the fifty-seven courts had three or more judges, and
those courts accounted for almost 80 percent of the receipts and of
136
completed proceedings in 2008.

130. Id. at 11.
131. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ACIJ Assignments: Dec. 2009, http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/sibpages/ACIJAssignments.htm#ACIJ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (listing the ACIJs and
their court assignments).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Compare id. (listing ACIJ assignments) with EOIR, supra note 26 (listing immigration
judges by court).
135. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-29.
136. See EOIR, supra note 5, at B3 tbl.1; EOIR, supra note 26.
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As much as small numbers and geographic remoteness may limit
the ACIJs’ effectiveness (and I have no knowledge of their
effectiveness), there may also be limitations stemming from what
appears to be the job description. On the EOIR website, immediately
below the link to the ACIJs and their areas of responsibility, are links
137
to directions for filing complaints about IJ conduct. Picking up on
the “chief judge as supervisor” tone, the ABA Commission report
lists its recommendations for more ACIJs in a section headed
138
“Inadequate Supervision and Discipline,” and a recent TRAC
report on implementation of the attorney general’s 2006 changes
139
reflects the same orientation.
The emphasis on ACIJs as supervisors and discipliners reflects
the well-publicized concern over abusive and intemperate behavior
140
by some IJs—those Professor Legomsky calls the “bad apples.” Part
of any chief judge’s job is dealing with judicial misconduct—by
looking for its causes and seeking individual remedies, from
counseling to public reprimands to reporting the judge to a
disciplinary body. But dealing with bad apples is not a chief judge’s
only function.
Ostrom and his colleagues describe a different type of chief
judge, focused less on supervising a group of bureaucrats and more on
leading a group of professionals “by fostering agreement among
members and staff of the court in a collegial manner” and
“encourag[ing] other judges and staff to embrace one set of cultural
orientations in case management style and change management and
141
another set in judge-staff relations and internal organization.” This
observation is hardly novel. Steven Flanders’s 1977 study of factors
associated with successful court and case management in federal
district courts attributed the characteristics observed in high
performing courts largely to those courts’ chief judges and what he
called their “exceptional personal skills,” as well as their ability to

137. EOIR, supra note 26.
138. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-29.
139. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION COURTS:
STILL A TROUBLED INSTITUTION (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/ (detailing
Government Accountability Office criticism of the attorney general’s ACIJ “[p]ilot [p]rogram
[t]o [d]eploy [s]upervisors to [r]egional [o]ffices”).
140. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1675.
141. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 111, at 127 (emphasis omitted).
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forge compromises, deal effectively with procedural issues, and work
142
hard.
The emphasis of the ABA judicial administration standards
comports generally with Ostrom and his colleagues’ findings. For
example, although the ABA recognizes the chief justice as the central
authority of each state’s court system, it says that each trial court
should have its own administration “so that it can manage its
143
business.” In this scheme, the chief judge of each court assumes a
key role, not only as “the locus of responsibility for internal
management, coordination between units, and conduct of external
144
relations,” but also to “[s]et an example in performance of judicial
and administrative functions,” emphasizing the importance of “tact,
the ability to listen, attention to the interests of others, and
145
persuasiveness.”
I have no evidence to suggest whether the current ACIJs
function in a similar manner. At least one IJ writing specifically about
the problem of unrepresented aliens praises her ACIJ for
encouraging the judges to seek ways to improve aliens’ legal
146
representation, pro bono and otherwise.
But it is unlikely that the current ACIJ arrangement fosters—or,
given the numbers, even permits—the kind of chief judge stewardship
envisioned for third branch courts.
2. Performance Measures. The other principle that emerges is
the importance of measuring performance. For the immigration
courts, measurement should be done in more areas and with more
precision than casually chronicling IJs’ growing backlogs and
collecting (some admittedly horrific) anecdotes about some IJs’
irresponsible and discourteous behavior. “Excellent courts
systematically measure the quality as well as the efficiency and
147
effectiveness of the services they deliver,” and those services extend
well beyond disposing of cases quickly to include, for example, the
first of the CourTools core measures, “Access and Fairness.” Ostrom
142. STEVEN FLANDERS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NO. FJC-R-77-6-1, CASE MANAGEMENT
78 (1977).
143. 2 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., supra note 99, at 29.
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id. at 44–46.
146. Noel Brennan, A View from the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 627
(2009). Judge Brennan is an IJ at the main immigration court in New York City.
147. INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, supra note 129, at 33.
AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
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and his colleagues similarly emphasize systematic rather than casual
and anecdotal measurement, and they suggest that the chief judge
follow up when a judge fails to comply with agreed-upon reporting
148
protocols.
Performance measurement can be both court based, such as
CourTools, and individual judge based, typically, judicial
performance evaluation (JPE), and can serve various purposes.
Courts use CourTools as a management assessment device and to be
accountable and transparent to court users and resource providers.
“JPE” is a shorthand term of art that refers to a particular approach
to measuring aspects of a judge’s performance. Various forms of JPE,
149
which first appeared in the 1970s and was the subject of 1985 ABA
150
standards, are in use, typically by statute or court rule, in at least
151
nineteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
Independent commissions use surveys and interviews of those who
interact with the judge, case management data, and the judge’s work
product to evaluate a judge on a regular schedule in the performance
areas of legal knowledge, integrity and impartiality, communication
152
skills, judicial temperament, and administrative skills.
These
evaluations serve various purposes: to assess the need for judicial
education; to provide judges with objective information about their
strong and weak points; and, in some states, to assist voters or others
153
who decide whether to retain judges in office.
Performance
evaluation supporters insist that judicial discipline is not a purpose of
JPE and warn against disseminating a judge’s JPE information to
154
judicial disciplinary bodies.

148. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 111, at 145.
149. Rebecca Kourlis & Jordan Singer, A Performance Evaluation Program for the Federal
Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 10 n.9 (2008).
150. See SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, ABA,
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (1985). The Guidelines were
reaffirmed in 2005. See ABA, BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/lawyersconf/pdf/jpec_
final.pdf.
151. Kourlis & Singer, supra note 149, at 9.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Id. at 9.
154. See ABA, supra note 150, at 1 (“Guideline 2-3. The uses of judicial performance
evaluation do not include judicial discipline. The information developed in a judicial evaluation
program should not be disseminated to authorities charged with disciplinary responsibility,
unless required by law or by rules of professional conduct.”).
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It bears emphasis that some of the DOJ administrative policies
that most bother IJs are, in principle, integral components of high
performing courts, including performance assessments and caseprocessing standards. Professor Legomsky and others rightly ask
whether the performance evaluations used for the immigration courts
(and the BIA) stress productivity to the exclusion of other judicial
155
virtues, and IJs cite what the National Association of Immigration
Judges refers to as “a well-recognized and long-established principle
that administrative law judges must be exempt from the provisions of
agency administered performance evaluations . . . precisely to ensure
156
their independence in decision-making.”
But the skewed emphasis that Professor Legomsky finds in the
EOIR instruments, as well as their administration by executive
branch supervisors, are not indictments of the concept of measuring
judicial performance. They are indictments, rather, of how DOJ has
implemented the concept. By analogy, JPE proponents see properly
constructed and administered judicial performance evaluations as an
antidote to interest groups that, in the post–Republican Party of
157
Minnesota v. White era, demand that judicial candidates complete
158
questionnaires concerning their views on substantive legal matters.
3. Importing Third Branch Court Tools into Immigration Courts.
I do not yet have a proposal for how a well-intentioned DOJ (or
Professor Legomsky’s proposed freestanding Office of the Chief
Administrative Law Judge for Immigration) can bring to immigration
courts the staples of well-performing third branch courts, such as
chief judges in each multijudge court or performance measures in the
full range of court functions. The key considerations, though, are
heavy involvement by the judges themselves and by independent,
knowledgeable observers, as well as maintaining management
oversight sufficient to provide accountability to Congress. And
although the stunningly high per-judge caseloads may make it
155. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 2, at 128–29 n.123 (discussing the BIA’s emphasis on
productivity).
156. Marks, supra note 9, at 14.
157. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (striking down, as
violating the First Amendment, an ethics code that prohibited judicial candidates from
announcing their views on disputed issues).
158. See, e.g., Terry Carter, The Big Bopper: This Terre Haute Lawyer Is Exploding the
Canons of Judicial Campaign Ethics, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 30, 34 (2006) (discussing “the use
of interest-group questionnaires being sent to judges up for retention or re-election and to their
challengers”).
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impractical to right the ship as opposed to constantly bailing it out,
there may be room for trying new approaches in courts with perjudge caseloads below the average. In 2008, fourteen immigration
courts had less than nine hundred proceedings per judge—generally
closer to the range that the ABA Immigration Commission report
159
seemed to find acceptable in other administrative courts —and these
160
fourteen courts include nine courts with three or more judges. (Raw
caseload numbers, however, may hide differences in case types and
thus in the work required to dispose of different caseloads.)
CONCLUSION
Reinhold Niebuhr famously noted in 1944 that “democracy is a
161
method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems.” The
immigration adjudication system has proved to be an insoluble
problem. It does not trivialize Niebuhr’s analysis of how to deal with
profound social and political problems to envision, with respect to
immigration adjudication, what he called “indeterminate creative
162
ventures.”

159. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-28.
160. These calculations are based on the 224 judges listed on the EOIR website under
Immigration Courts Nationwide and on receipt and other data reported in the EOIR 2008
Statistical Year Book. See EOIR, supra note 5, at B2; EOIR, supra note 26.
161. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS
118 (1944).
162. Id. at 144.

